What about the most thorough beating they received from Germans in 1914-1917 ended in the most humiliated treaties Russia ever was part of - Brest Litovsk in 1918?
They gave up ALL POLAND, UKRAINE, BALTICS and more (including Donbas!!!)
Bolsheviks were able to re-claim part of it only because Germany was beaten in the West and evacuated Ober-Ost army
I tried to limit myself for brevity sake, so I focused on peace/ceasefire treaties that actually lasted more than a year. But of course it's true that Russia was generally beaten in World War I, Red or White, all of it.
This pause in the hostilities was enough for Poland and Baltic states to consolidate their independence. Sadly, it did not apply to Ukraine and Belarus. Fast forward - 30, 40 millions victims of collectivization, de-kulakization, de-cossackization, Holodomore - hell on Earth...
Poland and the Baltics achieved the critical mass of self-determination...
And this wasn't the last time Ukraine paid the price for Poland's security.
When Poland and other EE countries negotiated their NATO membership in the 90s, Ukraine wanted to join too. Borys Tarasiuk said that it would be "unacceptable" for NATO to expand without admitting Ukraine. But in 1993, Wałęsa made this informal deal with Yeltsin that Russia won't oppose Poland joining NATO at the condition that Poland will not involve itself in Ukraine affairs unless there's a military crisis there (i.e., Poland won't support Ukraine's bid to join NATO).
(My source is Sergei Plokhy's recent book about the Russo-Ukraine war, and he may well be biased here, though. I've caught him being a bit biased before.)
Interesting post, as always! There is yet one Russian defeat that slipped through: The Cold War defeat. Sure, it was not suffered in a direct military confrontation, but it was much more painful and humiliating for present day Russia than all other defeats listed; to the point that we can see Putinist RF as a vehicle for making it up and live glorious semi-Soviet life again with military might, interventions in Middle East or Africa, and rockets and moon vessels thrown into the space (with typically Soviet success ratio). True, Russians will not stop until defeated totally, and it opens interesting topic: could have US done more in 1990's and 2000s to make sure that this old vourdalak is nailed for good in its coffin?
Thanks! I wanted to focus on peace/ceasefire treaties, because obviously this war will end in one. It will probably change the world tremendously, so I can't help but try to imagine it. I must admit that in 1990's I was also naive enough to think Russia will become more liberal, eventually. I was not the only one in the world with this delusion. So any attempt to "do more" would spark protests of naive people like me, saying "give them time, don't push them too hard". Sorry! The hawks were right, I hate to admit.
In short, a Russian military expert (i.e. an actual military strategist, not a TV propagandist like Solovyov) suggested a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Europe, presumably Poland, arguing that the US would be unlikely to retaliate, because they wouldn't want to sacrifice Boston for Poznań. Of course, this doesn't change the conclusion that you can't give in to terrorists and that they must be defeated ASAP, but it does make me think that the nuclear risk is not as low as the "comrade chessmaster" blog note suggested.
I know that our host is allergic to YouTube, but for everyone else, I can recommend this guy; he's reasonable and knows a thing or two about Russian politics.
Thank you for the kind words and the correction, but please notice this is old news. It's from June. Russians keep talking about nuclear strike here or there (maybe on Poland, maybe on London, recently Soloviev had a very strange idea of nuking Rabotyne) since they started retreating. I must admit, a year ago I was a bit worried. Now I think it's nothing but empty bluff.
I know it's from June, and I don't interpret it as "get ready for Poznań to be nuked soon". It's more like: if I used to think the probability of a nuclear strike from Russia in the next few years was 0.1%, now I think it's 0.5% (numbers for illustration).
I don't think the comparison with Solovyov is valid. Putin & Co aren't going to make any decisions based on what Solovyov said on TV, but they might make a decision based on Karaganov's input.
"they might make a decision based on Karaganov's input"
- If certain idea is given to the public by another mr nobody important, it's propaganda (aimed at causing fear and doubt). An actual threat would come from Putin or similar. When it comes from someone else, it allows those in power full deniability. Meaning deniability is the main goal here - because they suspect NATO will call their bluff.
If your primary goal is to send an actual warning (because it's actual threat with actual intent behind it), you focus on it sounding genuine. Not on deniability.
Karaganov has been Putin's advisor. Do you know enough about his informal position in the hierarchy of people linked to Putin to say that he's mr nobody important?
I'm not saying they are sending a warning, I'm saying that Karaganov gave more prominence to the idea of a pre-emptive nuclear strike and made it more specific. And the more this idea is talked about in Kremlin and the more specific it is, the greater the chances that somebody at some point will decide "let's do it", even if they are currently 100% sure they don't want to do this.
"as been Putin's advisor. Do you know enough about his informal position"
- Informally launching nukes is rather complicated. Not out of question, however, I give you that.
I know he has no formal position of decision making kind, meaning he is great for deniablility. That is, bluffing as proxy of Putin. And if it swims like a duck and quacks like a duck...
Talking about nuclear strike is probably an assignment they have a schedule of.
I have exact opposite idea: the more it is talked about to the public, the less likely it is going to happen. Since this idea was communicated to the public, it's posturing.
Anyway, once someone in CIA/NSA/US DoD starts to believe nuclear strike by Moscow is imminent... well, we will all see who has better first strike capability. (Of course you may want to believe that Pentagon will believe the oh so very belivable Kremlin about intended targets AND bet literally evetything on it).
According to a completely anonymous and unreliable source (https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/), if Russia wanted to launch nukes without the USA detecting the preparations, it can do so. If it wanted to move nukes around so that the USA notices it, it can do so as well.
It's the opposite for me, actually. I was a bit worried a year ago, now I'm not. I don't believe in "Putin listening to his advisors". He is listening to the top oligarchs - and even then not as "this guy can be right" but as "this guy can hurt me, I must yield". At current point, it is more profitable for his oligarchs to turn in into a war that never ends.
It's also more profitable for the West to prolong this war, unfortunately, instead of helping Ukraine achieve a swift victory.
Short war: Russia withdraws without having its army thoroughly degraded, Ukraine joins NATO and its security becomes also the responsibility of the West. With Western lives on the line. Against a surviving Russian threat.
Long war: West degrades Russian military thoroughly with Ukrainians paying the price in blood. No Western lives are endangered in the process. Russia ceases to be a conventional threat to the West.
Unfortunately I agree. Military bloger Saponkov had a very sober commentary to the whacking Russian fleet took in recent days. It seems that as long as the war is going on, Ukraine can destroy one ship after another, until there is nothing left and Black Sea becomes a NATO lake, just like Baltic Sea. He blames NATO for this cunning plan (he cannot admit the whole invasion was generally a bad idea), but I think he's right. Swift victory would save Russian submarines.
Maybe it's possible to combine some advantages of both scenarios? E.g. Ukraine continues a bloody offensive to take over the Kherson & Zaporizhzhia regions (which seems unavoidable at this point anyway), perhaps some parts of Donbass, but later Ukraine neither launches another bloody offensive in Crimea, nor negotiates peace, but continues to strike at the Russian fleet and other Russian military targets. After all, it is also in Ukraine's interest that Russia ceases to be a threat.
And yet, not long enough :)
(referring to the last sentence obviously)
What about the most thorough beating they received from Germans in 1914-1917 ended in the most humiliated treaties Russia ever was part of - Brest Litovsk in 1918?
They gave up ALL POLAND, UKRAINE, BALTICS and more (including Donbas!!!)
Bolsheviks were able to re-claim part of it only because Germany was beaten in the West and evacuated Ober-Ost army
I tried to limit myself for brevity sake, so I focused on peace/ceasefire treaties that actually lasted more than a year. But of course it's true that Russia was generally beaten in World War I, Red or White, all of it.
This pause in the hostilities was enough for Poland and Baltic states to consolidate their independence. Sadly, it did not apply to Ukraine and Belarus. Fast forward - 30, 40 millions victims of collectivization, de-kulakization, de-cossackization, Holodomore - hell on Earth...
Poland and the Baltics achieved the critical mass of self-determination...
Well we sold Ukraine out
For 30 mln golden roubles we never even got. Talk about "lose virginity without even earning a rouble".
And this wasn't the last time Ukraine paid the price for Poland's security.
When Poland and other EE countries negotiated their NATO membership in the 90s, Ukraine wanted to join too. Borys Tarasiuk said that it would be "unacceptable" for NATO to expand without admitting Ukraine. But in 1993, Wałęsa made this informal deal with Yeltsin that Russia won't oppose Poland joining NATO at the condition that Poland will not involve itself in Ukraine affairs unless there's a military crisis there (i.e., Poland won't support Ukraine's bid to join NATO).
(My source is Sergei Plokhy's recent book about the Russo-Ukraine war, and he may well be biased here, though. I've caught him being a bit biased before.)
Interesting post, as always! There is yet one Russian defeat that slipped through: The Cold War defeat. Sure, it was not suffered in a direct military confrontation, but it was much more painful and humiliating for present day Russia than all other defeats listed; to the point that we can see Putinist RF as a vehicle for making it up and live glorious semi-Soviet life again with military might, interventions in Middle East or Africa, and rockets and moon vessels thrown into the space (with typically Soviet success ratio). True, Russians will not stop until defeated totally, and it opens interesting topic: could have US done more in 1990's and 2000s to make sure that this old vourdalak is nailed for good in its coffin?
Thanks! I wanted to focus on peace/ceasefire treaties, because obviously this war will end in one. It will probably change the world tremendously, so I can't help but try to imagine it. I must admit that in 1990's I was also naive enough to think Russia will become more liberal, eventually. I was not the only one in the world with this delusion. So any attempt to "do more" would spark protests of naive people like me, saying "give them time, don't push them too hard". Sorry! The hawks were right, I hate to admit.
Hear hear...
I believed that too - to my eternal shame.
PS
I actually love Russian literature, music and poetry so it really hurts my feelings to see them entering the abyss, but what can one do?
Huh. It's only recently that I've been able to listen again to Russian classical music. For a year or so I just switched the channel on the radio.
But, one can deny themselves Shostakovich only for so long.
““Russia cannot be defeated” is propaganda nonsense”
Maybe they think about a general defeat (like Germany in 1945) not like simply loosing a war?
Thanks for the interesting note! Civic proofreading: Chechnya, not Chechenya.
I've got something that fits more with the note on nuclear blackmail, but maybe it's not completely off topic here.
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-06-23/russia-intensifies-its-nuclear-blackmail
In short, a Russian military expert (i.e. an actual military strategist, not a TV propagandist like Solovyov) suggested a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Europe, presumably Poland, arguing that the US would be unlikely to retaliate, because they wouldn't want to sacrifice Boston for Poznań. Of course, this doesn't change the conclusion that you can't give in to terrorists and that they must be defeated ASAP, but it does make me think that the nuclear risk is not as low as the "comrade chessmaster" blog note suggested.
PS. This is where I found out about it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtqHuURHOsE
I know that our host is allergic to YouTube, but for everyone else, I can recommend this guy; he's reasonable and knows a thing or two about Russian politics.
Thank you for the kind words and the correction, but please notice this is old news. It's from June. Russians keep talking about nuclear strike here or there (maybe on Poland, maybe on London, recently Soloviev had a very strange idea of nuking Rabotyne) since they started retreating. I must admit, a year ago I was a bit worried. Now I think it's nothing but empty bluff.
I know it's from June, and I don't interpret it as "get ready for Poznań to be nuked soon". It's more like: if I used to think the probability of a nuclear strike from Russia in the next few years was 0.1%, now I think it's 0.5% (numbers for illustration).
I don't think the comparison with Solovyov is valid. Putin & Co aren't going to make any decisions based on what Solovyov said on TV, but they might make a decision based on Karaganov's input.
"they might make a decision based on Karaganov's input"
- If certain idea is given to the public by another mr nobody important, it's propaganda (aimed at causing fear and doubt). An actual threat would come from Putin or similar. When it comes from someone else, it allows those in power full deniability. Meaning deniability is the main goal here - because they suspect NATO will call their bluff.
If your primary goal is to send an actual warning (because it's actual threat with actual intent behind it), you focus on it sounding genuine. Not on deniability.
Karaganov has been Putin's advisor. Do you know enough about his informal position in the hierarchy of people linked to Putin to say that he's mr nobody important?
I'm not saying they are sending a warning, I'm saying that Karaganov gave more prominence to the idea of a pre-emptive nuclear strike and made it more specific. And the more this idea is talked about in Kremlin and the more specific it is, the greater the chances that somebody at some point will decide "let's do it", even if they are currently 100% sure they don't want to do this.
"as been Putin's advisor. Do you know enough about his informal position"
- Informally launching nukes is rather complicated. Not out of question, however, I give you that.
I know he has no formal position of decision making kind, meaning he is great for deniablility. That is, bluffing as proxy of Putin. And if it swims like a duck and quacks like a duck...
Talking about nuclear strike is probably an assignment they have a schedule of.
I have exact opposite idea: the more it is talked about to the public, the less likely it is going to happen. Since this idea was communicated to the public, it's posturing.
Anyway, once someone in CIA/NSA/US DoD starts to believe nuclear strike by Moscow is imminent... well, we will all see who has better first strike capability. (Of course you may want to believe that Pentagon will believe the oh so very belivable Kremlin about intended targets AND bet literally evetything on it).
According to a completely anonymous and unreliable source (https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/), if Russia wanted to launch nukes without the USA detecting the preparations, it can do so. If it wanted to move nukes around so that the USA notices it, it can do so as well.
It's the opposite for me, actually. I was a bit worried a year ago, now I'm not. I don't believe in "Putin listening to his advisors". He is listening to the top oligarchs - and even then not as "this guy can be right" but as "this guy can hurt me, I must yield". At current point, it is more profitable for his oligarchs to turn in into a war that never ends.
It's also more profitable for the West to prolong this war, unfortunately, instead of helping Ukraine achieve a swift victory.
Short war: Russia withdraws without having its army thoroughly degraded, Ukraine joins NATO and its security becomes also the responsibility of the West. With Western lives on the line. Against a surviving Russian threat.
Long war: West degrades Russian military thoroughly with Ukrainians paying the price in blood. No Western lives are endangered in the process. Russia ceases to be a conventional threat to the West.
Unfortunately I agree. Military bloger Saponkov had a very sober commentary to the whacking Russian fleet took in recent days. It seems that as long as the war is going on, Ukraine can destroy one ship after another, until there is nothing left and Black Sea becomes a NATO lake, just like Baltic Sea. He blames NATO for this cunning plan (he cannot admit the whole invasion was generally a bad idea), but I think he's right. Swift victory would save Russian submarines.
Maybe it's possible to combine some advantages of both scenarios? E.g. Ukraine continues a bloody offensive to take over the Kherson & Zaporizhzhia regions (which seems unavoidable at this point anyway), perhaps some parts of Donbass, but later Ukraine neither launches another bloody offensive in Crimea, nor negotiates peace, but continues to strike at the Russian fleet and other Russian military targets. After all, it is also in Ukraine's interest that Russia ceases to be a threat.