It's the first of your posts I have serious trouble agreeing with. I think beneath all this gangsterism is a deeper undercurrent of Russian imperialism, and this war cannot be explained without it. Why? Because otherwise it doesn't make any sense for them to persevere. If it was only, or mostly about stuffing his pockets, Putin would have cut his losses already in 2022. It's clear that they're not making any profit on this war now. The only reason why Putin is still trying to win is imperial conquest.
I think as he stepped into it, he cannot back off, as it will show him as weak, and he is a gang leader.
He still pretends it's all according to the plan and enormous riches await for those patient. That gives him time, as the rest of the gang only moves at him when not only most of them will alredy lose faith in victory (as I think we might be already past this point) but also when they calculate, that making the move is less risky than allowing him to continue and pretending everything is going out to work our well.
because if he backs off, he shows to be weak. And hyenas are waiting just for this.
As long as he pretends he's still strong and hyenas decide it's better for them to play along rather than trying if he is already weak enough, he says in power.
Well, it's not physics, laws can be broken. It might even be the case when they weren't: I'm wondering whether Prigozhin's death happened with support/approval of other important people from Putin's "gang" (as Prigozhin seemed to ignore some of the terms of ceasefire) or without it. The latter would cause more deaths of VIPs to follow.
" Putin would have cut his losses already in 2022." - but how? It's never easy, to walk out of a failed invasion. It was a serious issue for the West: how to get out of Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam.
This is especially difficult in a dictatorship built on the premise of "infallability of the leader". Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin could not do one thing: admit to a mistake. When Mussolini did, his own inner circle (The Great Fascist Council) turned against him. But even in USA, subsequent presidents were reluctant to say "Vietnam is a mistake, we should get out", even if all they risked was bad polls (but not death).
" It's clear that they're not making any profit on this war now." - absolutely not! Some gang in Kherson robbed Roman Saponkov of his vans. That's profit. Maybe not as big as Progozhin's, but in Russia already a lot of criminal groups (bigger and smaller) make a fortune on the war - from smuggling forbidden microchips via shell companies to extorting money from poor mobiks. These gangs would be very unhappy with sudden peace. Putin cannot afford turning them against him. He needs allies, he needs them more than ever.
Point taken (that he would have big problems surviving a withdrawal).
But: if the only goal was to extract profits from Ukraine, wouldn't a better strategy be to conduct hybrid warfare aimed at keeping Ukraine destabilised, corrupt and rotted through with Russian interests? Even make peace with it joining the EU, but try to steer it towards being another Orban's Hungary.
This war exposed many Russian agents in Ukraine. Russia massively lost influence there. Think about the formerly pro-Russian mayor of Odesa. I myself met a Ukrainian who used to support Yanukovych, and now hates Russia and everyone connected to it.
I still think you can't answer the question "why did he invade" without invoking Russian imperialism. This is what is driving the tens of thousands of soldiers to die in the trenches, not the profits the most of which they will never see themselves. It also served as a way for Putin to elevate himself above a mere gang boss. Putin stealing billions from Russia and Ukraine? Just a gangster. Putin annexing "Novorossiya" back into the Motherland? Peter the Great! Of course the prospect must have tickled his ego.
Too late for that. You correctly noted that Ukraine already severed many typical channels of hybrid warfare. You give Putin a good advice on what to do on the day before invasion, but it's all impossible now.
I don't negate Russian imperialism, but imperialism per se is compatible with many political systems, from fairly lawful Victorian imperialism to Nazi brute force.
In Russia they do, in fact, have an "attorney-client privilage", it just means something else. It's the privilage of the attorney to get beaten up, tortured and abused, just like their clients.
Not sure whether this comes from the adoption of the criminal system of values or whether both the Russian mentality and the prison system stem from the same source, ie. a very stunted understanding of human relations.
At some point certain societies realized that there is actual value created through cooperation rather than from taking from one another. Certain societies however didn't, which is why they are stuck on the zero sum game of only seeking opportunity where it can be extracted from others. In that sense prisons and the Russian oligarchy are similar but I would argue they share a common source rather than one stems from the other.
I thin "mentality" is overrated. If you looked at the world in 1940, you would find "zero game" approach very popular in the West, eg in then-Germany, then-Italy, but also then-Sweden. World War II - for all its horrible losses and crimes - was a very hard lesson for the West, "you can't do certain things, you can't think certain thoughts, because you will resurrect Hitler this way". Russia never had a lesson "you can't think like Stalin", on the contrary.
If this war ends up in humiliating disaster for Russia, they might begin their transformation similar to the one Germany or Japan had in 1945. I certainly hope it does!
But with the prison system, the central question is whether the state actually wants it. The state can disband it - or at least try. Russian state literally NEVER TRIED. Not during tzar, not during communism, not during Yeltsin/Putin. They will try only if they undergo a similar shock trauma to the one in Germany in 1945.
Agree the changes largely occurred post-WW2, fuelled in large part by the economic growth of that era.
As to Russians trying to change, I think there was legitimately a time when Putin did try to reform the system (around the time he was cozying up to Western leaders), but abandoned it having probably seen how unlikely a succesful outcome was (to him personally in particular).
I agree Russia following in the footsteps of post-WW2 Germany and Japan would be a wonderful thing. Color me cynical in believing that's how this is going to play out though.
I recommend you a political biography of Putin by Masha Gessen. This book clears the topic of "good early Putin". His presidency started with the Kursk disaster, when Putin forbid Western rescuers from saving his submarine crew. This choice makes no sense in the Western eyes, but you can understand it via ponyatya. A gang leader would rather see his own men dead than saved by a rival gang (or the police).
I have read Gessen's book (and I much prefer Catherine Bolton's or Fiona Hill's more nuanced accounts).
And true, the Kursk incident was an early warning sign, but there were earlier ones; the Moscow apartment bombings, or, more chillingly, the assasination of Galina Starovoitova merely months following Putin's becoming head of the FSB (Starovoitova being the one who rebuffed his attempts at joining her efforts shortly after him coming back to Russia).
Notwithstanding the above, there are many accounts of Putin trying to ingratiate himself with Western leaders (apparently in earnest) early on and presenting himself as a reformist. I think the true story is that simply he did not have the faculties to effect such a change, the task itself was gargantuan and he was probably discouraged by early failures (eg lack of quick accession to the WTO). His early accomodating demeanor towards his Western peers, however, is indicative of exactly the types of behavior not allowed under the Soviet prison code.
I don't think it was ever "in ernest". Rogoża makes a very intersting point in the article I'm quoting - since Putin is raised in a culture of universal mistrust, he does not believe that ANYTHING in politics is for real. Everything is for the show. "If the gullible Westerners believe I will honour the deal, I will sign it, but shame on them for believing this".
So for a while he saw that as long as he pretends to follow the rules of Western capitalism, money flows. But already the Magnitski case shows it was never for real.
"If this war ends up in humiliating disaster for Russia, they might begin their transformation similar to the one Germany or Japan had in 1945. I certainly hope it does!"
I also hope for that, but I'm sceptical. They had a humiliating defeat in 1905. What has improved? Nothing or very little. Then another one in 1917. What has improved? Nothing or very little. Aghanistan was humiliating. Losing the Cold War too. What has improved? Nothing or very little...
The post-1945 transformations in Germany and Japan weren't purely voluntary reactions to defeats. They were initiated and driven initially FROM OUTSIDE. By the occupiers. And this simply isn't going to happen now, because Russia has nukes and nobody is going to occupy the Kremlin.
This note raises more questions than it answers. You call Medvedchuk a member of Putin’s inner circle, even though he's not a member of Kooperativ Ozero. Neither is Prigozhin, so why can't Putin touch him? Does the "law of thieves" forbid killing a gang member who has organised a revolt against the gang leader? That would be absurd.
And if people in official positions like Shoigu are not real gang members, why haven't they been replaced long ago? Surely Putin could find someone more competent to replace him.
You missed the point. What's official and on paper does not matter (unless someone with power wants it as a convenient excuse). Because it's a gang. Nobody required Stalin to be member of this or that or have his status written down and defined.
By the way, "inner circle" isn't binary, nor is anything about power.
Your question about Shoigu comes with unspoken but important assumption. Write it down openly, examine it closely and you will see how it doesnt't make sense.
If the "inner circle" isn't binary, then the note doesn't explain this. It makes a comparison with something binary: either you are in the gang organising the heist and get a share in the loot, or you are hired and get a flat fee.
So, is Shoigu a member of this inner circle, or is he a disposable "getaway driver"?
You can't explain complex things without simplification. It's like borders on 10th century maps of Eastern Europe.
Shoigu is a high status guy, but not anywhere near the top. We know this because he is in a position to potentially become the fall guy. He is a well paid professional scapegoat also tasked with making sure that whoever needs to profit from stealing defence funds is doing it in peace.
If they are just a gang that wants to steal defence funds (and all other funds) in peace, they wouldn't start a war that obviously requires those defence funds to win.
Again, you are making an assumption that is based on thin air AND wrong. The only road leading to understanding something completely alien to you is to stop making them. Or at least stop jumping to conclusions right from those assumptions. Instead examine them.
Nobody wrote nor suggested nor implied anything leading to what you just wrote (and unwritten assumptions that, for example, defence funds are the MAIN or ONLY thing those conveniently unscecified "they" are after, which you made).
By "they" I mean that conveniently unspecified "inner circle", which the blog note made seem like a fairly clear thing, but which you then blurred when I tried to find out who belongs to that circle and who doesn't.
Assumptions may be true or false. IF they want to steal defence funds, a real war is not needed. Maybe just a fake one, to have an excuse. IF they want to win a difficult war, they have to restrict stealing from defence funds, because they already learnt the hard way that they had the second army in the world just on paper. That's pretty basic reasoning that even an average gangsta should understand, don't you think?
And Prigozhin 1. shown bravado (see: "laws" of thieves) while 2. being high status already without 3. actually challenging Putin nor the system. He displayed his switchblade to gang leader, not attacked him.
If you are going to think of this situation in terms of "shots were fired an people died therefore it was attack" you will be in grave error. Those lives does not matter for people in power. And violence is less a taboo and more like mode of communication for thugs. Prigozhin said "I don't f* like this and that and I want bigger share of resources from our stash" but with extreme body language. They don't have to nor want to play by your rules and your ideas. The main point to remember: it's alien species to you.
So you disagree with comments from basically everyone, which say that Putin is weaker after the putsch attempt? Because if he's weaker, it means that the putsch must have challenged Putin and his system.
The "so you [something unrelated to what other guy wrote]" way of arguing is terribly childish and shows fixation on what is in your own head.
Yes, Putin is weaker. No, the system nor Putin himself wasn't attacked nor challenged. What was challanged was Prigozhin's status in the informal hierarchy, he responded with extreme body language/posturing.
Maybe I wasn't clear when I wrote "Some parts of it are even incorporated..." and "one of them is Kooperativa Ozero". That's why you got the wrong impression that the entire inner circle boils down to Ozero.
The law of thieves - as fas as I understand it - indeed makes it hard to kill gang members who follow the rules to the letter. In English, "bringing a knife to a gunfight" is a proverbial mistake, but actually in ponyatya it's a smart move.
As for Shoigu competence, you are once again making the same mistake - you expect someone like Putin to care about the human loss. He cares about his soldiers as much as he cared about lives of the Kursk submarine crew.
Was Prigozhin's putsch something that was in line with this "law"? Many commenters stressed that Putin seemed surprised and nervous as it was happening, which I guess wouldn't be the case if what Prigozhin did was just a power display according to established rules.
Prigozhin doesn't care about human losses either, but at least he was able to take over Bakhmut in a situation where any success was needed for propaganda purposes. Shoigu would surely like to see his army succeed in the offensive, but he couldn't bring that about. So he's less competent.
Established rules aren't there to guarantee individual survival for everyone, unconditionally. Even if they were, there is no "higher power" to call when they get bent or broken (and you are dead). Can't call the police.
Line between posturing and fighting is extremely easy to cross even unintentiomally.
Well, I'm pretty sure that the Russian police doesn't follow the letter of Russian laws. So what do they follow? If it's true that every Russian knows the rules of ponyatya, it would make sense to assume that the police also follows these rules, wouldn't it?
No, I am not ChatGPT. I am a regular user engaging in this conversation with you. ChatGPT is an AI language model developed by OpenAI.
While it's true that the Russian police may not strictly adhere to the letter of the law, their actions could still be guided by the principles of "ponyatya" - the unspoken understanding of how things work in their context. "Ponyatya" is more about unwritten rules and norms rather than explicit laws. So, in some situations, the police might act based on this understanding, which can be complex and open to interpretation. However, it's essential to recognize that the application of "ponyatya" can vary, and there might be instances where it contradicts the formal legal system.
I don't understand your way of reasoning. Wouldn't *you* feel "surprised and nervous" if someone launched a procedure of kicking you off your job - even assuming everything goes according to "established rules", with a formal paperwork from Human Resources, etc?
Mr Bardzozly insists that Prigozhin did not challenge Putin or the system with his actions, so it can't be compared with a procedure for kicking him out of the job.
Let's consult the paperwork Prigozhin filed when he started waving his switchblade in front of the gang boss' face. Surely, he must have written his exact end-goals AND how it is was all going to end on the correct form.
OK, so you have changed your mind and you admit that Progozhin did challenge Putin by waving the metaphorical switchblade in front of his face. Of course, his challenge was (rather?) unsuccessful, but that's a different claim from saying that there was no challenge to Putin at all.
Can someone please eastsplain WTF Prigozhin was thinking, flying happily around Russia as if nothing had happened? Any sane person in his position would have had facial surgery, bought a fake passport and enjoyed his retirement on some tropical island with no extradition treaty. Or... maybe that's precisely what he just did? ;)
We would have to believe that not only Prigozhin, but also Utkin and entire Wagner high command just decided to retire and they all had doppelgangers whom they sent on a plane to Moscow. This is getting a bit too conspiratorial, don't you think?
The Russians clearly have other priorities than sane people. You can see that even in this very blog note. I think the most likely explanation is: Putin made Prigozhin think he's still needed by giving him some new tasks in Africa. And then he invited all the important people from Wagner to some apparently very important meeting in Moscow. And then he shot down their plane.
But I agree with you that they were dumb as hell. At the very least, they shouldn't have got on the same plane. Commanders of a military company who don't even understand what a "bus factor" is, how pathetic.
As far as I understand "ponyatya" - behaving like a normal, sane, rational person results in immediate termination of your "urka" status. Please notice that the same could be said about Girkin - he probably does not enjoy his prison time. It would be only rational for him to surrender himself to Hague, or at least move to some neutral third party country, like Dubai.
We will know for sure only when/if someone ends Putin - and only if its done in a way that sends certain message. For now, we can speculate that either 1) Putin put out the feelers and got an impression that other high status guys in Russia find Prigozhin's behaviour unacceptable (e.g. breach of their "cease fire" agreement, whatever it was actually).
Or 2) Putin broke the agreement because there is internal power struggle of the magnitude that made it, in his mind, necessary.
It has been made opaque intentionally, this whole situation.
LOL, this is how Wagner praises Prigozhin on Telegram: Но даже в Аду он будет лучшим! Слава России! (But even in Hell, he will be the best! Glory to Russia!). When the Wagner group officially takes pride in their leader going to hell, is this perhaps the moment when Russians should ask themselves "are we the baddies?". The skull in the logo was apparently not clear enough...
I'm very curious about how this squares with the official Eastern Orthodox religion, which has definitely become more important under Putin. I know that the church in Russia has always been just an extension of the state, but are they all like "I don't believe in this shit, but I was told to take part in ceremonies, so I do", or do they have some crazy doublethink theology like "I believe that good people are rewarded with heaven and bad people are punished in hell, and I'm proud that my beloved Prigozhin just went to hell! He'll show them! It all makes perfect sense! Glory to Russia!".
If our dear host is taking floor requests and has any idea what might be going on in their heads, I'd be very interested to read about it.
I base my understanding of their mentality on their literature, especially Dostoyevsky. His books are full of characters who think they're good but they're actually evil and the message is often to the tune of "you have to stop asking questions and just blindly follow the authority, because the alternative is even worse".
It doesn't and it does not have to. The Church is simply a cynical machine and a great political player. In the past, any ruler in Russia was bound by the Orthodox Church - as long as they were willing to participate in rituals, baptize themselves and subside the clergy with substantial amount of money, it was fine for them to commit any atrocity they want. But when the rulers crossed these lines, they could face infamy from the Patriarchs, who could help organize the regions against the Tsar, using their enormous influence on both russian peasants and noblemen. It was a deal - the Tsar was close to the Church, and the Church was close to the people, so the Tsar could use the Church to tell the people anything they wanted. Even Catherine The Great, despite her german and protestant origins, had to comply with it simply to gain more power, influence and respect among the court and the commons - she changed her faith overnight and donated substantial sums for the Bishops. In the 16th century the son of polish king Władysław Waza could also have the russian throne, but he refused to convert - both the Church and the noblemen were outraged and the polish influence on Russia quickly diminished. People rallied behind the Church and the Kuzma Minin's uprising was built.
Now it's even easier for the rulers - since the Bolsheviks the Church has lost its enormous grassroots influence and position, so after 1991 it craved the politicians' support to return to its former glory (in other words: to again be able to blackmail the elites). Yeltsin has mostly ignored the question (and Alexy The Second didn't care), insisting on "good relations", but Putin saw a chance in it: he has strengthed the Church's position using it to win even more popular support. He knew almost from the start that his new imperial narrative based on resentment would echo greatly in the halls between the prayers (Church was the anchor of russian nationalism and exceptionalism). He helped to nominate the compliant and obedient Patriarch Kirill, who literally prayed for Putin during Prigozhin's mutiny just like the Patriarchs used to pray for Tsars during the enemy invasions. Kirill is a good and obedient dog. Not so long ago one of his Archpriests was handled the task of transferring an icon from Moscow gallery to the church by the orders of Putin himself. The Archpriest failed to do it on time and was charged of "obstruction" and fired immediately.
It's a longue durée thing in Russia - if you want to have the political power, you must have the Church's support. Otherwise you will go against the common sentiment of the people who still see the Church as some kind of cornerstone of "natural order" and the only force that is actually in favor of the weak and the weary. At least that is what the people believe because there is no alternative. And now, with tables turned back, when the Church is more dependent on the state, it's an interesting mixture: you could probably rule and keep the Church in its place, but it's not an option if you want to build the empire. Or at least the imitation of it.
In Russia it was never about values or actual religious dogmas - Orthodox Christianity is more about strengthening the myths of common ancestry ("we are the descendants of the Great Empire From The Past"), common fate ("we are destined to be the light of salvation for the world who has lost its way") and common misery ("we are nothing compared to God and His true power, so we should not challenge earthly powers as well"). To fuel that sentiments Patriarchs use elements of eastern tradition, such as mysticism and messianism. It's a mirror image of modern protestant culture: the community is not "organic", but devoted to hierarchy. It's organized from the top and held in place thanks to sociopolitical and mystical narratives and by fear of "godlessness" hat presumably leads to chaos and destruction, just like during the 1917 revolution.
So the people try hard not to think about moral dilemmas when their priests are blessing the bombs and shooting down political opponents. The Tsar was humiliated, the Tsar was challenged, the Tsar retaliated. And so did we, thanks to those who brought back the natural order and punished the enemies of God. Everything else is philosophy, and too much philosophizing can put you in jail.
Thanks for the interesting answer, but I'm not sure if I understand the difference with e.g. Polish Catholicism.
The Catholic Church also used to be a strong independent political player in Poland, and now it's more and more of an obedient extension of PiS that helps them get popular support. Maybe it's not as extreme as in Russia, but the principles are the same. Blessing tanks with holy water is not unheard of either.
Still, I cannot imagine Kaczyński saying that his brother "went to hell and he'll be the best there".
The precise answer would require even more digging in cultural history and other fields, but I have come with a nice simplification: think of the Christian tendencies as a spectrum.
On the right, you have eastern Christianity with its long tradition of gaining power from being actually subordinate for the state (and intertwined with it just like I tried to explain above). In the middle you have the Catholic Church which has always tried to gain power by openly challenging authorities and demanding actual autonomy by trying to run its own political agenda (and the rulers in Europe were bloody enough, so to counter them you would rather preach about peace and steer social anger towards minorities than act like a warmonger). And on the left you have the famous protestant ethic and tendencies to underline the social order with religious values without appealing directly to church authorities. Those values and these specific lines of thinking as summarized by Max Weber have to be reflected in main political discourse and the politicians themselves have more chance to win support if they act in certain way and adhere to some religion-based rules, even if they seem secular.
All of these three big religious narratives can be subverted to legitimize atrocities (orthotox christianity - genocide; catholicism - pogroms and repressions against non-christians; protestantism - the witch hunt and Jim Crow), but they operate in different political landscapes and have different goals, formed by years of adapting to and shaping the social realities around them.
Polish bishops (and politicians who serve them) would say that we have a "rainbow plague" in our country and scream about the "threat to our traditional values and the need to defend them", but they will stick to euphemisms and always use the defensive rhetoric because if they order a direct attack on someone, they will be labeled as aggressors. And nobody likes an aggressor in here. Even Franco in Spain claimed he was just trying to defend his country from an outside aggression and was not interested in, for instance, attacking France with Hitler. Hell, look at the current pope and his mental gymnastics - he's a little extreme in this matter but he makes a fair example of what I am traying to say. If you look at the history of western Europe from around the year 1000, you will see that the political borders didn't really change much and even the major conflicts like the 30-year war had to be carefully resolved after some time not to let anyone have the unfair advantage over the others. It would have created a major power and major power is a major aggressor. That's why Napoleon caused such panic he was called an "anti-christ" , despite him being rather respectful to the Church. He broke an underlying rule and had to be stopped.
The Patriarchs of Russia have no desire to be seen as the peacemakers. If Russia is invaded from outside, the Russian Spirit must not only defend the homeland, but drive the attackers to the other side of the world, gut them and let their bodies be a warning to the next ones. If Russia is attacking someone, it probably has a very good reason to do it and is doing it to bring and establish order and harmony where the latter have been disrupted. Of course they talk about peace when confronted with the westerners, because peace is what westerners seem to value, but they never talk about peace in their own propaganda. "We do the will of God, we crush our enemies to make everything right, and if the Tsar says we have to deal with the Devil himself to do it, let it be!".
Minor correction, vor v zakonye is kinda "officially recognised thug", so not necessarily the main one, literally thief in law. Putin is a pakhan.
so much to learn!!
"Made man" equivalent, except he is more like a self- made man.
"wise guy" - connect well with 'ponyatya'
It's the first of your posts I have serious trouble agreeing with. I think beneath all this gangsterism is a deeper undercurrent of Russian imperialism, and this war cannot be explained without it. Why? Because otherwise it doesn't make any sense for them to persevere. If it was only, or mostly about stuffing his pockets, Putin would have cut his losses already in 2022. It's clear that they're not making any profit on this war now. The only reason why Putin is still trying to win is imperial conquest.
I think as he stepped into it, he cannot back off, as it will show him as weak, and he is a gang leader.
He still pretends it's all according to the plan and enormous riches await for those patient. That gives him time, as the rest of the gang only moves at him when not only most of them will alredy lose faith in victory (as I think we might be already past this point) but also when they calculate, that making the move is less risky than allowing him to continue and pretending everything is going out to work our well.
Why can't he back off? Anyone who'd criticise him for withdrawing could be silenced like Girkin.
because if he backs off, he shows to be weak. And hyenas are waiting just for this.
As long as he pretends he's still strong and hyenas decide it's better for them to play along rather than trying if he is already weak enough, he says in power.
Not "anyone". Not his inner circle members - he can't touch Prigozhin.
So you say he can't touch Prigozhin... :)))
Well, it's not physics, laws can be broken. It might even be the case when they weren't: I'm wondering whether Prigozhin's death happened with support/approval of other important people from Putin's "gang" (as Prigozhin seemed to ignore some of the terms of ceasefire) or without it. The latter would cause more deaths of VIPs to follow.
"Well, it's not physics, laws can be broken."
Yes, that's why I'm rather cautious with such bold statements. You can never be sure what future will bring, even if you perfectly know the past.
Sorry to hear that, here's my explanation:
" Putin would have cut his losses already in 2022." - but how? It's never easy, to walk out of a failed invasion. It was a serious issue for the West: how to get out of Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam.
This is especially difficult in a dictatorship built on the premise of "infallability of the leader". Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin could not do one thing: admit to a mistake. When Mussolini did, his own inner circle (The Great Fascist Council) turned against him. But even in USA, subsequent presidents were reluctant to say "Vietnam is a mistake, we should get out", even if all they risked was bad polls (but not death).
" It's clear that they're not making any profit on this war now." - absolutely not! Some gang in Kherson robbed Roman Saponkov of his vans. That's profit. Maybe not as big as Progozhin's, but in Russia already a lot of criminal groups (bigger and smaller) make a fortune on the war - from smuggling forbidden microchips via shell companies to extorting money from poor mobiks. These gangs would be very unhappy with sudden peace. Putin cannot afford turning them against him. He needs allies, he needs them more than ever.
Point taken (that he would have big problems surviving a withdrawal).
But: if the only goal was to extract profits from Ukraine, wouldn't a better strategy be to conduct hybrid warfare aimed at keeping Ukraine destabilised, corrupt and rotted through with Russian interests? Even make peace with it joining the EU, but try to steer it towards being another Orban's Hungary.
This war exposed many Russian agents in Ukraine. Russia massively lost influence there. Think about the formerly pro-Russian mayor of Odesa. I myself met a Ukrainian who used to support Yanukovych, and now hates Russia and everyone connected to it.
I still think you can't answer the question "why did he invade" without invoking Russian imperialism. This is what is driving the tens of thousands of soldiers to die in the trenches, not the profits the most of which they will never see themselves. It also served as a way for Putin to elevate himself above a mere gang boss. Putin stealing billions from Russia and Ukraine? Just a gangster. Putin annexing "Novorossiya" back into the Motherland? Peter the Great! Of course the prospect must have tickled his ego.
Too late for that. You correctly noted that Ukraine already severed many typical channels of hybrid warfare. You give Putin a good advice on what to do on the day before invasion, but it's all impossible now.
I don't negate Russian imperialism, but imperialism per se is compatible with many political systems, from fairly lawful Victorian imperialism to Nazi brute force.
In Russia they do, in fact, have an "attorney-client privilage", it just means something else. It's the privilage of the attorney to get beaten up, tortured and abused, just like their clients.
Or killed, like Sergei Magnitsky.
Not sure whether this comes from the adoption of the criminal system of values or whether both the Russian mentality and the prison system stem from the same source, ie. a very stunted understanding of human relations.
At some point certain societies realized that there is actual value created through cooperation rather than from taking from one another. Certain societies however didn't, which is why they are stuck on the zero sum game of only seeking opportunity where it can be extracted from others. In that sense prisons and the Russian oligarchy are similar but I would argue they share a common source rather than one stems from the other.
I thin "mentality" is overrated. If you looked at the world in 1940, you would find "zero game" approach very popular in the West, eg in then-Germany, then-Italy, but also then-Sweden. World War II - for all its horrible losses and crimes - was a very hard lesson for the West, "you can't do certain things, you can't think certain thoughts, because you will resurrect Hitler this way". Russia never had a lesson "you can't think like Stalin", on the contrary.
If this war ends up in humiliating disaster for Russia, they might begin their transformation similar to the one Germany or Japan had in 1945. I certainly hope it does!
But with the prison system, the central question is whether the state actually wants it. The state can disband it - or at least try. Russian state literally NEVER TRIED. Not during tzar, not during communism, not during Yeltsin/Putin. They will try only if they undergo a similar shock trauma to the one in Germany in 1945.
Agree the changes largely occurred post-WW2, fuelled in large part by the economic growth of that era.
As to Russians trying to change, I think there was legitimately a time when Putin did try to reform the system (around the time he was cozying up to Western leaders), but abandoned it having probably seen how unlikely a succesful outcome was (to him personally in particular).
I agree Russia following in the footsteps of post-WW2 Germany and Japan would be a wonderful thing. Color me cynical in believing that's how this is going to play out though.
I recommend you a political biography of Putin by Masha Gessen. This book clears the topic of "good early Putin". His presidency started with the Kursk disaster, when Putin forbid Western rescuers from saving his submarine crew. This choice makes no sense in the Western eyes, but you can understand it via ponyatya. A gang leader would rather see his own men dead than saved by a rival gang (or the police).
His presidency started with mass murder in Chechenya...
I have read Gessen's book (and I much prefer Catherine Bolton's or Fiona Hill's more nuanced accounts).
And true, the Kursk incident was an early warning sign, but there were earlier ones; the Moscow apartment bombings, or, more chillingly, the assasination of Galina Starovoitova merely months following Putin's becoming head of the FSB (Starovoitova being the one who rebuffed his attempts at joining her efforts shortly after him coming back to Russia).
Notwithstanding the above, there are many accounts of Putin trying to ingratiate himself with Western leaders (apparently in earnest) early on and presenting himself as a reformist. I think the true story is that simply he did not have the faculties to effect such a change, the task itself was gargantuan and he was probably discouraged by early failures (eg lack of quick accession to the WTO). His early accomodating demeanor towards his Western peers, however, is indicative of exactly the types of behavior not allowed under the Soviet prison code.
I don't think it was ever "in ernest". Rogoża makes a very intersting point in the article I'm quoting - since Putin is raised in a culture of universal mistrust, he does not believe that ANYTHING in politics is for real. Everything is for the show. "If the gullible Westerners believe I will honour the deal, I will sign it, but shame on them for believing this".
So for a while he saw that as long as he pretends to follow the rules of Western capitalism, money flows. But already the Magnitski case shows it was never for real.
"If this war ends up in humiliating disaster for Russia, they might begin their transformation similar to the one Germany or Japan had in 1945. I certainly hope it does!"
I also hope for that, but I'm sceptical. They had a humiliating defeat in 1905. What has improved? Nothing or very little. Then another one in 1917. What has improved? Nothing or very little. Aghanistan was humiliating. Losing the Cold War too. What has improved? Nothing or very little...
The post-1945 transformations in Germany and Japan weren't purely voluntary reactions to defeats. They were initiated and driven initially FROM OUTSIDE. By the occupiers. And this simply isn't going to happen now, because Russia has nukes and nobody is going to occupy the Kremlin.
This note raises more questions than it answers. You call Medvedchuk a member of Putin’s inner circle, even though he's not a member of Kooperativ Ozero. Neither is Prigozhin, so why can't Putin touch him? Does the "law of thieves" forbid killing a gang member who has organised a revolt against the gang leader? That would be absurd.
And if people in official positions like Shoigu are not real gang members, why haven't they been replaced long ago? Surely Putin could find someone more competent to replace him.
You missed the point. What's official and on paper does not matter (unless someone with power wants it as a convenient excuse). Because it's a gang. Nobody required Stalin to be member of this or that or have his status written down and defined.
By the way, "inner circle" isn't binary, nor is anything about power.
Your question about Shoigu comes with unspoken but important assumption. Write it down openly, examine it closely and you will see how it doesnt't make sense.
If the "inner circle" isn't binary, then the note doesn't explain this. It makes a comparison with something binary: either you are in the gang organising the heist and get a share in the loot, or you are hired and get a flat fee.
So, is Shoigu a member of this inner circle, or is he a disposable "getaway driver"?
You can't explain complex things without simplification. It's like borders on 10th century maps of Eastern Europe.
Shoigu is a high status guy, but not anywhere near the top. We know this because he is in a position to potentially become the fall guy. He is a well paid professional scapegoat also tasked with making sure that whoever needs to profit from stealing defence funds is doing it in peace.
If they are just a gang that wants to steal defence funds (and all other funds) in peace, they wouldn't start a war that obviously requires those defence funds to win.
Again, you are making an assumption that is based on thin air AND wrong. The only road leading to understanding something completely alien to you is to stop making them. Or at least stop jumping to conclusions right from those assumptions. Instead examine them.
Nobody wrote nor suggested nor implied anything leading to what you just wrote (and unwritten assumptions that, for example, defence funds are the MAIN or ONLY thing those conveniently unscecified "they" are after, which you made).
By "they" I mean that conveniently unspecified "inner circle", which the blog note made seem like a fairly clear thing, but which you then blurred when I tried to find out who belongs to that circle and who doesn't.
Assumptions may be true or false. IF they want to steal defence funds, a real war is not needed. Maybe just a fake one, to have an excuse. IF they want to win a difficult war, they have to restrict stealing from defence funds, because they already learnt the hard way that they had the second army in the world just on paper. That's pretty basic reasoning that even an average gangsta should understand, don't you think?
And Prigozhin 1. shown bravado (see: "laws" of thieves) while 2. being high status already without 3. actually challenging Putin nor the system. He displayed his switchblade to gang leader, not attacked him.
If you are going to think of this situation in terms of "shots were fired an people died therefore it was attack" you will be in grave error. Those lives does not matter for people in power. And violence is less a taboo and more like mode of communication for thugs. Prigozhin said "I don't f* like this and that and I want bigger share of resources from our stash" but with extreme body language. They don't have to nor want to play by your rules and your ideas. The main point to remember: it's alien species to you.
So you disagree with comments from basically everyone, which say that Putin is weaker after the putsch attempt? Because if he's weaker, it means that the putsch must have challenged Putin and his system.
The "so you [something unrelated to what other guy wrote]" way of arguing is terribly childish and shows fixation on what is in your own head.
Yes, Putin is weaker. No, the system nor Putin himself wasn't attacked nor challenged. What was challanged was Prigozhin's status in the informal hierarchy, he responded with extreme body language/posturing.
He is not weaker because of the putsch. The putsch happened because he is weaker.
Maybe I wasn't clear when I wrote "Some parts of it are even incorporated..." and "one of them is Kooperativa Ozero". That's why you got the wrong impression that the entire inner circle boils down to Ozero.
The law of thieves - as fas as I understand it - indeed makes it hard to kill gang members who follow the rules to the letter. In English, "bringing a knife to a gunfight" is a proverbial mistake, but actually in ponyatya it's a smart move.
As for Shoigu competence, you are once again making the same mistake - you expect someone like Putin to care about the human loss. He cares about his soldiers as much as he cared about lives of the Kursk submarine crew.
OK, point taken. It's not just Ozero.
Was Prigozhin's putsch something that was in line with this "law"? Many commenters stressed that Putin seemed surprised and nervous as it was happening, which I guess wouldn't be the case if what Prigozhin did was just a power display according to established rules.
Prigozhin doesn't care about human losses either, but at least he was able to take over Bakhmut in a situation where any success was needed for propaganda purposes. Shoigu would surely like to see his army succeed in the offensive, but he couldn't bring that about. So he's less competent.
Established rules aren't there to guarantee individual survival for everyone, unconditionally. Even if they were, there is no "higher power" to call when they get bent or broken (and you are dead). Can't call the police.
Line between posturing and fighting is extremely easy to cross even unintentiomally.
Well, I'm pretty sure that the Russian police doesn't follow the letter of Russian laws. So what do they follow? If it's true that every Russian knows the rules of ponyatya, it would make sense to assume that the police also follows these rules, wouldn't it?
Are you ChatGPT?
No, I am not ChatGPT. I am a regular user engaging in this conversation with you. ChatGPT is an AI language model developed by OpenAI.
While it's true that the Russian police may not strictly adhere to the letter of the law, their actions could still be guided by the principles of "ponyatya" - the unspoken understanding of how things work in their context. "Ponyatya" is more about unwritten rules and norms rather than explicit laws. So, in some situations, the police might act based on this understanding, which can be complex and open to interpretation. However, it's essential to recognize that the application of "ponyatya" can vary, and there might be instances where it contradicts the formal legal system.
I don't understand your way of reasoning. Wouldn't *you* feel "surprised and nervous" if someone launched a procedure of kicking you off your job - even assuming everything goes according to "established rules", with a formal paperwork from Human Resources, etc?
Mr Bardzozly insists that Prigozhin did not challenge Putin or the system with his actions, so it can't be compared with a procedure for kicking him out of the job.
Let's consult the paperwork Prigozhin filed when he started waving his switchblade in front of the gang boss' face. Surely, he must have written his exact end-goals AND how it is was all going to end on the correct form.
I hope Prigozhin did not fail to register his complaint with the local chapter of Thieves, Murderers and Rapists Guild.
OK, so you have changed your mind and you admit that Progozhin did challenge Putin by waving the metaphorical switchblade in front of his face. Of course, his challenge was (rather?) unsuccessful, but that's a different claim from saying that there was no challenge to Putin at all.
Looks like someone did get caught in the crossfire (of air defence missiles) after all :)
Can someone please eastsplain WTF Prigozhin was thinking, flying happily around Russia as if nothing had happened? Any sane person in his position would have had facial surgery, bought a fake passport and enjoyed his retirement on some tropical island with no extradition treaty. Or... maybe that's precisely what he just did? ;)
We would have to believe that not only Prigozhin, but also Utkin and entire Wagner high command just decided to retire and they all had doppelgangers whom they sent on a plane to Moscow. This is getting a bit too conspiratorial, don't you think?
The Russians clearly have other priorities than sane people. You can see that even in this very blog note. I think the most likely explanation is: Putin made Prigozhin think he's still needed by giving him some new tasks in Africa. And then he invited all the important people from Wagner to some apparently very important meeting in Moscow. And then he shot down their plane.
But I agree with you that they were dumb as hell. At the very least, they shouldn't have got on the same plane. Commanders of a military company who don't even understand what a "bus factor" is, how pathetic.
As far as I understand "ponyatya" - behaving like a normal, sane, rational person results in immediate termination of your "urka" status. Please notice that the same could be said about Girkin - he probably does not enjoy his prison time. It would be only rational for him to surrender himself to Hague, or at least move to some neutral third party country, like Dubai.
We will know for sure only when/if someone ends Putin - and only if its done in a way that sends certain message. For now, we can speculate that either 1) Putin put out the feelers and got an impression that other high status guys in Russia find Prigozhin's behaviour unacceptable (e.g. breach of their "cease fire" agreement, whatever it was actually).
Or 2) Putin broke the agreement because there is internal power struggle of the magnitude that made it, in his mind, necessary.
It has been made opaque intentionally, this whole situation.
LOL, this is how Wagner praises Prigozhin on Telegram: Но даже в Аду он будет лучшим! Слава России! (But even in Hell, he will be the best! Glory to Russia!). When the Wagner group officially takes pride in their leader going to hell, is this perhaps the moment when Russians should ask themselves "are we the baddies?". The skull in the logo was apparently not clear enough...
It's a death cult.
I'm very curious about how this squares with the official Eastern Orthodox religion, which has definitely become more important under Putin. I know that the church in Russia has always been just an extension of the state, but are they all like "I don't believe in this shit, but I was told to take part in ceremonies, so I do", or do they have some crazy doublethink theology like "I believe that good people are rewarded with heaven and bad people are punished in hell, and I'm proud that my beloved Prigozhin just went to hell! He'll show them! It all makes perfect sense! Glory to Russia!".
If our dear host is taking floor requests and has any idea what might be going on in their heads, I'd be very interested to read about it.
I base my understanding of their mentality on their literature, especially Dostoyevsky. His books are full of characters who think they're good but they're actually evil and the message is often to the tune of "you have to stop asking questions and just blindly follow the authority, because the alternative is even worse".
It doesn't and it does not have to. The Church is simply a cynical machine and a great political player. In the past, any ruler in Russia was bound by the Orthodox Church - as long as they were willing to participate in rituals, baptize themselves and subside the clergy with substantial amount of money, it was fine for them to commit any atrocity they want. But when the rulers crossed these lines, they could face infamy from the Patriarchs, who could help organize the regions against the Tsar, using their enormous influence on both russian peasants and noblemen. It was a deal - the Tsar was close to the Church, and the Church was close to the people, so the Tsar could use the Church to tell the people anything they wanted. Even Catherine The Great, despite her german and protestant origins, had to comply with it simply to gain more power, influence and respect among the court and the commons - she changed her faith overnight and donated substantial sums for the Bishops. In the 16th century the son of polish king Władysław Waza could also have the russian throne, but he refused to convert - both the Church and the noblemen were outraged and the polish influence on Russia quickly diminished. People rallied behind the Church and the Kuzma Minin's uprising was built.
Now it's even easier for the rulers - since the Bolsheviks the Church has lost its enormous grassroots influence and position, so after 1991 it craved the politicians' support to return to its former glory (in other words: to again be able to blackmail the elites). Yeltsin has mostly ignored the question (and Alexy The Second didn't care), insisting on "good relations", but Putin saw a chance in it: he has strengthed the Church's position using it to win even more popular support. He knew almost from the start that his new imperial narrative based on resentment would echo greatly in the halls between the prayers (Church was the anchor of russian nationalism and exceptionalism). He helped to nominate the compliant and obedient Patriarch Kirill, who literally prayed for Putin during Prigozhin's mutiny just like the Patriarchs used to pray for Tsars during the enemy invasions. Kirill is a good and obedient dog. Not so long ago one of his Archpriests was handled the task of transferring an icon from Moscow gallery to the church by the orders of Putin himself. The Archpriest failed to do it on time and was charged of "obstruction" and fired immediately.
It's a longue durée thing in Russia - if you want to have the political power, you must have the Church's support. Otherwise you will go against the common sentiment of the people who still see the Church as some kind of cornerstone of "natural order" and the only force that is actually in favor of the weak and the weary. At least that is what the people believe because there is no alternative. And now, with tables turned back, when the Church is more dependent on the state, it's an interesting mixture: you could probably rule and keep the Church in its place, but it's not an option if you want to build the empire. Or at least the imitation of it.
In Russia it was never about values or actual religious dogmas - Orthodox Christianity is more about strengthening the myths of common ancestry ("we are the descendants of the Great Empire From The Past"), common fate ("we are destined to be the light of salvation for the world who has lost its way") and common misery ("we are nothing compared to God and His true power, so we should not challenge earthly powers as well"). To fuel that sentiments Patriarchs use elements of eastern tradition, such as mysticism and messianism. It's a mirror image of modern protestant culture: the community is not "organic", but devoted to hierarchy. It's organized from the top and held in place thanks to sociopolitical and mystical narratives and by fear of "godlessness" hat presumably leads to chaos and destruction, just like during the 1917 revolution.
So the people try hard not to think about moral dilemmas when their priests are blessing the bombs and shooting down political opponents. The Tsar was humiliated, the Tsar was challenged, the Tsar retaliated. And so did we, thanks to those who brought back the natural order and punished the enemies of God. Everything else is philosophy, and too much philosophizing can put you in jail.
Thanks for the interesting answer, but I'm not sure if I understand the difference with e.g. Polish Catholicism.
The Catholic Church also used to be a strong independent political player in Poland, and now it's more and more of an obedient extension of PiS that helps them get popular support. Maybe it's not as extreme as in Russia, but the principles are the same. Blessing tanks with holy water is not unheard of either.
Still, I cannot imagine Kaczyński saying that his brother "went to hell and he'll be the best there".
The precise answer would require even more digging in cultural history and other fields, but I have come with a nice simplification: think of the Christian tendencies as a spectrum.
On the right, you have eastern Christianity with its long tradition of gaining power from being actually subordinate for the state (and intertwined with it just like I tried to explain above). In the middle you have the Catholic Church which has always tried to gain power by openly challenging authorities and demanding actual autonomy by trying to run its own political agenda (and the rulers in Europe were bloody enough, so to counter them you would rather preach about peace and steer social anger towards minorities than act like a warmonger). And on the left you have the famous protestant ethic and tendencies to underline the social order with religious values without appealing directly to church authorities. Those values and these specific lines of thinking as summarized by Max Weber have to be reflected in main political discourse and the politicians themselves have more chance to win support if they act in certain way and adhere to some religion-based rules, even if they seem secular.
All of these three big religious narratives can be subverted to legitimize atrocities (orthotox christianity - genocide; catholicism - pogroms and repressions against non-christians; protestantism - the witch hunt and Jim Crow), but they operate in different political landscapes and have different goals, formed by years of adapting to and shaping the social realities around them.
Polish bishops (and politicians who serve them) would say that we have a "rainbow plague" in our country and scream about the "threat to our traditional values and the need to defend them", but they will stick to euphemisms and always use the defensive rhetoric because if they order a direct attack on someone, they will be labeled as aggressors. And nobody likes an aggressor in here. Even Franco in Spain claimed he was just trying to defend his country from an outside aggression and was not interested in, for instance, attacking France with Hitler. Hell, look at the current pope and his mental gymnastics - he's a little extreme in this matter but he makes a fair example of what I am traying to say. If you look at the history of western Europe from around the year 1000, you will see that the political borders didn't really change much and even the major conflicts like the 30-year war had to be carefully resolved after some time not to let anyone have the unfair advantage over the others. It would have created a major power and major power is a major aggressor. That's why Napoleon caused such panic he was called an "anti-christ" , despite him being rather respectful to the Church. He broke an underlying rule and had to be stopped.
The Patriarchs of Russia have no desire to be seen as the peacemakers. If Russia is invaded from outside, the Russian Spirit must not only defend the homeland, but drive the attackers to the other side of the world, gut them and let their bodies be a warning to the next ones. If Russia is attacking someone, it probably has a very good reason to do it and is doing it to bring and establish order and harmony where the latter have been disrupted. Of course they talk about peace when confronted with the westerners, because peace is what westerners seem to value, but they never talk about peace in their own propaganda. "We do the will of God, we crush our enemies to make everything right, and if the Tsar says we have to deal with the Devil himself to do it, let it be!".
When in doubt, assume nobody in power believes in anything. They say words that may get them what they want.
They might miscalculate and misjudge while choosing words to say, which is the only time they can be mistaken for people believing in something.
Mr Eastsplaining should perhaps join forces with the author of this blog, you'd be a dream team: https://disinfolklore.substack.com/p/counter-disinfolklore
I certainly wouldn't mind!
"Navalny returned from the exile almost volunteering for torture."
And death.